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> Context • Philosophical and – more recently – empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the re-
search into lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-
referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called 
“excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific 
practice. > Problem • What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively acquired phenomenological data? Can 
the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense 
and use of its results? > Method • Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we 
explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past 
experience. > Results • We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective re-
flection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines 
– rather than distorts – its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the 
act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. 
Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of 
expectations. > Implications • Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential 
for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particu-
larly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. > Constructivist content • We relate 
the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an 
epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological 
objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a col-
laboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the 
potential for their mutual enrichment. > Key words • Reflection, enaction, constructivism, past experience, excavation 
fallacy, second-person methodology.
Introduction
It feels like going into a space, slightly 
blurred and delimited from another 
space – like an enclosed mist – this 
is the memory. I have found it … 
As I move closer towards the 
memory, I am going deeper and 
more narrowly into this space. 
(From a report by a co-researcher)
« 1 » The history of philosophy and the 
more recent history of western science have 
witnessed many diverse conceptualizations 
of reflection on lived experience and held a 
spectrum of different judgments of its im-
portance, scope, and validity. Ranging from 
the conviction of the absolute primacy of re-
flectively gained first-person knowledge to 
its complete dismissal, the epistemic value 
assigned to the results of reflection has incit-
ed various philosophical and scientific de-
bates. However, much less – and not enough 
– attention has been dedicated to the expe-
riential dynamics of the reflective process. 
In this article, we would like to encourage a 
consideration of firs t-person aspects of the 
act of reflection and point out their impor-
tance for the understanding of reflectively 
acquired beliefs.
« 2 » The central aim of our investiga-
tion is to explore the experiential structure 
of the act of reflection and the formation of 
the corresponding belief about past experi-
ence. As there are more ways to reflectively 
turn towards lived experience, the expres-
sion “reflection” has been employed to de-
scribe a family of acts rather than one exact 
process, sometimes being used synony-
mously with – or replaced by – terms like 
introspection, retrospection, self-observa-
tion, contemplation, becoming aware, etc. 
Accordingly, there have been a number of 
discussions about the terminology related 
to first-person methods in the science of 
consciousness (e.g., Zahavi 2011; Vermer-
sch 2011a; Bitbol & Petitmengin 2011). In 
this article, we use the terms “reflection,” 
“reflective process” and “reflective act” to 
designate the inquiry into lived experience 
in adoption of the so-called phenomenologi-
cal attitude (cf. Husserl 1982). Contrasted 
with the natural attitude of everyday life, the 
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by the reflecting subject’s active attempt to 
suspend or bracket assumptions and theo-
ries that she would commonly apply in her 
everyday understanding of the world, at-
tending instead to her lived experience as it 
is directly given in consciousness. Further-
more, we focus on a specific subtype of re-
flection: the retrospective reflective inquiry 
into a particular episode of one’s experien-
tial past, in which the subject attempts to 
arrive at knowledge of her past lived expe-
rience (of thinking, feeling, remembering, 
perceiving, acting, imagining, etc.).
« 3 » Although researchers of experi-
ence often emphasize that phenomeno-
logical reflection is a skillful endeavor that 
requires training and guidance (cf. Varela 
1996; depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003), 
our aim is to describe the general structure 
of the phenomenology of reflection that, 
in our view, applies to reflective processes 
performed with the purpose of first-person 
research as well as to casual everyday acts 
of retrieving past experience. The kind of 
reflective act that we are concerned with 
can be carried out by the reflecting subject 
alone or in cooperation with others, with or 
without the consequent verbal articulation, 
and in or out of the context of scientific in-
quiry.
« 4 » Whilst reflection may or may not 
result in the subject’s sense of knowledge of 
her past experience, we will focus on those 
instances in which it does. We will therefore 
describe the process of reflection in relation 
to the subject’s reflection-based formation 
of belief about her past experience. Here, 
we use the notion “belief about past expe-
rience” to specifically refer to what the re-
flecting subject experiences as knowledge 
of her past experience. We are aware that 
it is problematic to separate the term “be-
lief ” from its standard use in the context of 
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. 
However, we ask the reader to keep in mind 
that – putting aside this prevalent, but nev-
ertheless particular theoretical perspective 
– the meaning of the term “belief ” refers 
to experience. In this sense, the notion “be-
lief ” is here used as a technical term refer-
ring specifically to what is experienced as 
knowledge by the reflecting subject. Articu-
lated and expressed, usually in the form of 
verbal reports, beliefs about past experience 
amount to what the study of mind terms 
“first-person,” “experiential,” “phenomeno-
logical,” or sometimes “introspective” data.
« 5 » The process of the generation 
of first-person data has become a topic of 
considerable attention in the context of the 
development of second-person methods 
for the study of experience. However, the 
experiential structure of the reflective pro-
cess through which the first-person data 
are formed is far from understood (cf. Ver-
mersch 2009). Considering the importance 
of reflection for mind sciences and the un-
resolved disagreements about the validity 
and use of reflectively gained beliefs, the re-
lationship between the process of reflection 
and its results is in need of serious empiri-
cal as well as theoretical investigation. our 
study of reflection is motivated by a wish to 
contribute to the ongoing debate on epis-
temological and methodological issues in 
first-person research. stemming from the 
peculiar self-referentiality of the reflective 
act, many such issues appear to call for an 
overall rethinking of the mainstream episte-
mological background of studying the mind. 
By relating our examination of the experien-
tial dynamics of reflection to the construc-
tivist approach to knowledge, the second, 
more wide-ranging aim of our investigation 
is to demonstrate that constructivism pro-
vides an epistemological foundation for the 
empirical study of experience more suitable 
than the standard objectivist framework of 
cognitive science.
« 6 » The theoretical model of the re-
flective process presented in this article 
has been developed on the basis of findings 
gained through our ongoing first-person 
research on the phenomenology of belief 
formation. The research, the methodologi-
cal approach and first results of which are 
reported in Kordeš & Klauser (2016), aims 
at exploring subjects’ experience of the for-
mation of beliefs through second-person 
in-depth phenomenological inquiry. Al-
though the project is currently not focus-
ing specifically on the formation of beliefs 
about past experience through the process 
of reflection, it has brought about interest-
ing insights into the constructive dynamics 
of the process of belief formation that sug-
gest certain general characteristics of the 
experiential dynamics, applicable to the 
experience of reflection. Furthermore, the 
training of participants led to extensive me-
ta-awareness of the process of retrospective 
reflection, illustrated by the example report 
presented in Box 1.
« 7 » on the basis of our empirical in-
sights into the constructive nature of the re-
flective act, our model describes retrospec-
tive reflection as a process of the enaction of 
belief about past experience. The construc-
tivist concept of “enaction” was introduced 
into cognitive science with the development 
of the enactive approach, put forward in 
The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson 
& Rosch 1991). With the notion of enac-
tion, the proponents of this approach stress 
the inseparability of action and perception 
and point toward the mutual specification 
of the subject and the world. The core idea 
of the enactive approach is the description 
of cognition as embodied action: “A living 
organism enacts the world it lives in; its ef-
fective, embodied action in the world actu-
ally constitutes its perception and thereby 
grounds its cognition” (stewart, Gapenne 
& di Paolo 2010: vii). With its attempt to 
overcome the traditional rigid separation of 
perception and action in the study of mind, 
enactive cognitive science presents an alter-
native to realist representationalist research 
frameworks that have long dominated cog-
nitive science. It has recently gained wide 
popularity and developed into different lines 
of thought and investigation in various do-
mains of cognitive science (cf. Vörös, Froese 
& Riegler 2016).
« 8 » As its proponents explain, the 
enactive approach intends to “negotiate a 
middle path between the scylla of cognition 
as the recovery of a pregiven outer world 
(realism) and the Charybdis of cognition 
as the projection of a pregiven inner world 
(idealism)” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 
1991: 172). our aim in the present article 
is to identify a similar middle path in the 
particular process of reflection. We adopt 
the notion of enaction in order to indicate 
the active and therefore constructive na-
ture of “perceiving” one’s past experience 
and forming a belief about it. By viewing 
the belief about past experience as forged 
in the process of enaction, we wish to offer 
an alternative to the dilemma of whether 
the result of reflection is a “recovery” of a 
pre-existing past experience or a “projec-
tion” of the reflecting mind. We will argue 
for the mutual specification of the reflect-
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ing and the reflected-upon, suggesting that 
in grasping past experience, the reflective 
act actively co-determines the enacted be-
lief about it. We will describe the process of 
reflection as a dialectical path between the 
emergence and construction of the aspects 
of past experience. The iterative unfolding of 
the belief, we will suggest, is guided by the 
subject’s feeling of veracity and continuously 
steered by a number of factors, including 
the subject’s implicit expectations about her 
own experiential life, her perception of the 
social context, and the ongoing dynamics of 
the reflective process.
« 9 » In researching experience, we ap-
pear to be caught in a vicious circle: knowl-
edge about first-person aspects of the for-
mation of belief about past experience is 
considered to be essential for the validation 
of any first-person research – including the 
validation of the type of research necessary 
to acquire this very knowledge. The areas of 
phenomenology, first-person research, and 
neurophenomenology are brimming with 
similar feedback loops that cannot be disen-
tangled by the application of a single theo-
retical or empirical intervention. In order 
to resolve these loops, we suggest a gradual 
approach in which empirical and theoreti-
cal parts mutually complement one another 
step by step. The present article is an attempt 
at a small theoretical step along this path. 
What we present is an empirically informed 
philosophical discourse: a theoretical model 
developed in order to instruct and possibly 
guide future empirical research on expe-
rience, but which can at the same time be 
employed and put to the test by first-person 
and second-person methods for the study of 
consciousness.
« 10 » In describing reflection as a proc-
ess of enaction in which the subject turns 
towards her past experience in an articula-
tion of its pre-reflective aspects, we are talk-
ing about three different “species” of experi-
ence:
  The past experience (A), whose felt cor-
respondence with the enacted belief will 
be described as “the feeling of veracity.” 
This sense of correspondence of the 
enacted belief with the experience as it 
was pre-reflectively lived through guides 
the subject in the reflective act. unlike 
B and C, experience A is a theoretical 
concept: whilst in the reflective act, it 
might be posited as having existed, we 
remain agnostic about its actuality and 
ontological status.
  The experience as it is thematized in the 
reflective act (B), which amounts to the 
content of the subject’s enacted belief 
and, when aptly expressed, presents the 
reflectively acquired “first-person data.” 
Although the thematized experience 
is given in the “now” of reflection, it is 
given exactly as past, imbuing the reflec-
tive act with the feeling of evocation of 
and correspondence to the past experi-
ence A.
  The experience of the reflective act (C), 
which we attempt to characterize in the 
present article. Reflection is itself a new, 
fully-fledged act of consciousness.
Box 1: An example of a phenomenological report on the experience of reflection
This segment is taken from an interview conducted in the context of our re-
search on the enaction of beliefs. A co-researcher is reflecting on her past experi-
ence of being woken up at midnight by the ringing of her phone (original past 
experience A). The report continuously intertwines the description of the past 
experience (A) as it is brought forward in reflection (B) and the description of the 
experience of the reflective act itself (C). Note that the report on past experience 
(in italics) is embedded in describing the experience of the process of enaction of 
this report (in normal writing).
1. I try to look at what was going on in that moment, I search for this memory...
2. It feels like going into a space, slightly blurred and delimited from another 
space – like an enclosed mist – this is the memory. I have found it. In fact, it 
all comes to me very quickly, I don’t really need to search.
3. As I move closer towards the memory, I am going deeper and more narrowly 
into this space.
4. The first thing I remember is feeling shocked by the ringing of the phone and 
the feeling of confusion.
5. I am interested in what this confusion was like. I first remember the feeling 
of the absence of composure – but at the same time I immediately feel that 
this is not the only aspect to it.
6. I was somehow still half asleep, as if not all of me was participating in the 
conversation on the phone. I remember this feeling – it’s half automatic and 
somehow floating.
7. Since I have instantly felt that what I said so far doesn’t describe the entire 
feeling of confusion, I search for the other aspect of that feeling. I do this by 
returning to the broader feeling of my memory and then it feels like diving 
into another part of this area.
8. Now I remember that a part of the confusion was confusion about the time: 
I thought that I had been sleeping for considerably longer, that the time was 
closer to 4 AM and not midnight.
9. This “mistake” somehow attracts me – I look at this part of the memory more 
in detail, I somehow sharpen the appropriate part, which was before hidden 
in the mist.
10. I now see that my sense of the time was not accurate. A part of me felt that it 
was around 4 AM, while another part noticed that this feeling was somehow 
mistaken… I think that I felt that it was around 4 AM considering my feeling of 
how sleepy I was, but something else was opposing this feeling.
The report continues and ends with the co-researcher noting: “In the process of 
reflecting, there was a constant intertwining of the content of my past experi-
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Dissolution of excavation 
fallacy and reflection 
as measurement
« 11 » In the course of the history of con-
sciousness research, reflection has been as-
sociated with many problems, ranging from 
the issue of its irreproducibility and the dif-
ficulty of separating the reflecting subject 
from the object of reflection to worries about 
the verification of its results and the general 
possibility of objective knowledge of sub-
jectivity (cf. Bitbol & Petitmengin 2013b). 
Perhaps none of the problems of reflection 
appears as troublesome as the fact that ev-
ery attempt at observing experience changes 
the very experience that is being observed. 
Many philosophers and psychologists per-
ceive this self-referential characteristic as a 
death sentence to first-person inquiry as a 
form of scientific research. In the words of 
John searle:
“ The very fact of subjectivity, which we were try-
ing to observe, makes such an observation impos-
sible. Why? Because where conscious subjectivity 
is concerned, there is no distinction between the 
observer and the thing observed […] Any intro-
spection I have of my own conscious state is itself 
that conscious state.” (searle 1992: 97)
« 12 » Even defenders of first-person 
research do not deny the importance of 
this issue. natalie depraz, Francisco Varela 
& Pierre Vermersch (2003), who dub this 
self-referential characteristic an “excava-
tion fallacy” (probably referring to similar 
problems encountered in anthropology and 
archaeology), describe the situation as fol-
lows:
“ How do you know that by exploring experi-
ence with a method you are not, in fact, deform-
ing or even creating what you claim to ‘experi-
ence’? Experience being what it is, what is the 
possible meaning of your so-called ‘examination’ 
of it?” (ibid: 8)
« 13 » As opposed to searle, most pro-
ponents of first-person research main-
tain that the excavation fallacy should not 
stop us from attempting to study experi-
ence. They accordingly try to design their 
research techniques so that the problem 
is bypassed and the researched experi-
ence is caught as undisturbed as possible. 
A number of strategies have been offered 
that would enable a clear view of “pristine” 
experience. For instance, Franz Brentano 
(2015) and later introspectionists such as 
Wilhelm Wundt (1897) proposed that in-
vestigating experience requires a training 
of a passive form of inner perception. some 
newer empirical first-person approaches, 
e.g., the think-aloud protocol of Anders 
Ericsson and Herbert simon (1993), try to 
“catch” the here-and-now of the researched 
experience by allocating only minimal, par-
ticular cognitive resources to observing and 
reporting.
« 14 » Another, more frequently used at-
tempt at surmounting the excavation fallacy 
is the observation of an experience from the 
past. This approach is unavoidable for all so-
called second-person methods for the study 
of experience (cf. Froese, Gould & Barrett 
2011) that rely on the use of interviews for 
an interactive acquisition of first-person 
data. Most other first-person researchers 
also agree that it is most sensible – or, as 
claimed by William James (1890), only pos-
sible – to conduct research on past experi-
ence. This retrospective observation seems 
methodologically safer, i.e., less vulnerable 
to the observer’s influence, because the ex-
perience in question is already formed (and 
therefore seems to be a more suitable object 
of observation).
« 15 » Much like other attempts at cap-
turing the undisturbed lived experience, 
the observation of past experience does 
not, however, evade the inevitable interde-
pendence of the result of reflection and the 
reflective act. For one, psychology has long 
acknowledged the constructive nature of 
memory (Bartlett 1932) and conceded that 
remembering is no passive reproduction 
of memory traces stored in the mind, but 
rather an active and creative (re)construc-
tion of the past (e.g., neisser & Winograd 
1995). Various investigations of the scope 
and validity of first-person knowledge in 
the scientific context (e.g., nisbett & Wilson 
1977; Johansson et al. 2005) have further 
demonstrated that people are often unable 
to reliably report on their mental processes 
and that, failing to account for the motives 
and reasons for their actions, they even 
tend to engage in self-deceptive, confabu-
latory theorizing when asked about them. 
These findings have led many research-
ers to condemn the possibility of reliable 
first-person knowledge of consciousness. 
such condemnation, however, stems from 
a misunderstanding of the reflective act as 
it is performed in adoption of the phenom-
enological attitude. In the phenomenologi-
cal reflection that we consider in the present 
article, the subject does not aim at theoriz-
ing about her experience (for instance pro-
viding motives for particular actions, ex-
plaining reasons for particular choices or in 
any way accounting for her mental and ex-
periential states). on the contrary: the phe-
nomenological method requires precisely 
the suspension of causal and explanatory 
theories and the (re)turn to lived experi-
ence in its directness and concreteness. The 
shift from the natural to the phenomeno-
logical attitude involves a bracketing of ev-
eryday assumptions and convictions about 
the experienced world and a turn from the 
“what” (i.e., the content) of the experienced 
phenomena to their “how” (i.e., their mode 
of givenness). Given the profundity of this 
change – which Edmund Husserl (1970) 
even compared to a religious conversion – it 
is not surprising that simply asking an un-
trained subject about the contents of their 
mental states or the reasons for their actions 
might often lead to unviable answers.
« 16 » However, even in disregard of 
the standard objections concerned with 
the limitations, fallibility, and the possible 
confabulatory nature of introspective in-
sight, the reflective act is still marked by the 
problem of the horizon of reflection. Even 
when performed in the phenomenological 
attitude, every enaction of belief about past 
experience is still an outcome of a particular 
perspective determined by particular cir-
cumstances. Enaction is not an event, but a 
process, the result of which (a belief) is be-
ing formed through a series of gestures. As 
will be shown in the following section, these 
gestures are guided by motives and expec-
tations, demands of the perceived social 
context, the previously performed steps of 
the reflective process and various other fac-
tors, each of them actively contributing to 
the resulting belief. Even if one could abso-
lutely trust the reliability of one’s memory, 
the inevitable adoption of perspective alone 
imbues the reflective act with a constructive 
character. 
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Reflection as quantum 
measurement
« 17 » It has been suggested that the 
interdependence of the enacted belief and 
the reflective act can be elucidated with an 
analogy from the field of quantum mechan-
ics (Bitbol & Petitmengin 2013b; Kordeš 
2015a). In the early stages of the develop-
ment of quantum mechanics, physicists 
were faced with an epistemological dilemma 
much similar to the one encountered in 
gathering phenomenological data: it became 
clear that when dealing with quantum phe-
nomena, the act of measuring unavoidably 
affects the measurement outcome. one pos-
sible response to this situation has been to 
claim that it is pointless to speculate about 
what goes on at the quantum level when we 
are not observing – a view summarized by 
david Mermin’s famous directive: “shut up 
and calculate!” (cf. Mermin 2004). At first 
glance, the call to refrain from contem-
plating the ontological nature of entities 
involved in the physical formalism might 
appear as the physicists’ attempt at running 
away from essential philosophical questions 
arising from their research. However, the 
“shut up” directive can also be understood as 
a statement of a sound epistemological posi-
tion that acknowledges the interdependence 
of the measured phenomenon and the act of 
measurement.
« 18 » This position can be traced back 
to niels Bohr, one of the founders of quan-
tum theory.1 Bohr insisted on recognizing 
the inseparability of the result of quantum 
measurement from the experimental con-
text of the measuring act. He argued that 
it made no sense to speak of a “quantum 
world” underlying the abstract physical de-
scription (cf. Petersen 1963). Rather than 
referring to observer-independent quantum 
1 | Here, the example of quantum mechanics 
is not being used as a mere additional illustration. 
While the co-determination of observation (mea-
surement) and the observed (measured) has been 
given extensive theoretical attention in construc-
tivist philosophy, we are turning towards quan-
tum mechanics as the first empirical discipline 
that has not only noticed the excavation fallacy, 
but also offered a viable methodological solution. 
Even more: we suggest that the solution in ques-
tion is not a mere methodological workaround 
but a sound alternative epistemic attitude.
events, Bohr suggested, quantum mechanics 
deals with holistic phenomena that are nec-
essarily specified by the conditions of their 
manifestation. Accordingly, he replaced his 
early metaphor of the disturbance of quan-
tum properties by the measuring apparatus, 
proposing instead to understand the meas-
urement as an act that co-defines the meas-
ured phenomenon (cf. teller 1980; Bitbol & 
Petitmengin 2013b).
« 19 » Why should we not treat reflec-
tion on past experience the same way? 
Along the lines of Bohr’s approach to the 
measurement problem in quantum me-
chanics, we reject the a priori objection 
that the reflective act distorts the suppos-
edly pre-existing past experience. Instead, 
we propose to regard reflection as a kind 
of measurement that co-determines the 
resulting belief about the experience in 
question. The belief about past experience 
is necessarily actively forged through an 
experiential process of enaction. such a 
view dissolves the excavation fallacy by 
recognizing it as an intrinsic characteristic 
of the reflective process. once understood 
as an essential ingredient of the reflective 
process, the excavation characteristic is no 
longer construed as an unfortunate limita-
tion or impediment to researching experi-
ence. objections that reflection deforms 
experiential data therefore no longer apply: 
the act of reflection simply co-determines 
experience as it appears to us.
Experiential dynamics 
of excavation
« 20 » Acknowledging the unavoid-
able interdependence between observing 
and the observed points towards the im-
portance of knowing the characteristics of 
the act of reflection for understanding its 
results. This section is aimed at exploring 
the experiential dynamics of the reflective 
act. We present a first-person model of the 
enaction of past experience: an attempt to-
wards a generalized description of the ex-
perience of reflection in which the subject 
tries to remember and thematize a particu-
lar experience from the past.
« 21 » Let us first explain what this 
model is not. Firstly, it does not have quite 
the same ambition as philosophical phe-
nomenology, i.e., it does not attempt to 
speculate on fundamental (transcendental) 
conditions for consciousness that enable 
the experience of the enaction of belief. 
despite its being a theoretical model, its 
goal is to identify experiential processes 
that could be subjected to empirical obser-
vation. As described in the introduction, 
the basic contours of the proposed model 
have manifested during the (still ongoing) 
research on the experience of enaction of 
beliefs, the methodology and partial results 
of which are presented in Kordeš & Klauser 
(2016). We see our proposal as a first ap-
proximation in the line of back-and-forth 
dialogue between theoretical modeling and 
first-person empirical inquiry. We hope 
that such a means of investigation might be 
able to produce a model that would try to 
capture deep structures of experience, but 
nevertheless remain within the grasp of 
what is observable.
« 22 » Considering that reflection is 
simultaneously a process that we observe 
and a process with which we observe, it 
is important to stress that, secondly, the 
presented model is descriptive and not 
instructional. It has to be distinguished 
from a number of existing procedures or 
techniques for the acquisition of phenom-
enological data in research on experience, 
such as the three-step procedure for the 
performance of epoché suggested by de-
praz, Varela & Vermersch (2003), or guide-
lines for different interview techniques 
(e.g., Vermersch 2009; Petitmengin 2006; 
Hurlburt 2009). That is not our goal. We 
are attempting to describe the dynamics of 
reflection in the situation where conditions 
for the enaction of belief were given: the 
subjects adopted the phenomenological at-
titude of the enaction of belief, being aware 
of this gesture or not.
« 23 » our model sets out from the 
point at which the subject knows that the 
past experience is available and that she is 
able to answer the question “what was it 
like (to be me)” at the selected moment. 
We are therefore not interested in experien-
tial processes where – for instance during 
an interview – the answer to the question 
about past experience starts with “I don’t 
know” (Vermersch 2009; depraz, Varela 
& Vermersch 2003). Here, we rather focus 
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“observation” of past experience has arisen 
and (2) the subject has the feeling that she 
is able to recall that experience.
« 24 » As we have discussed above, the 
process of reflection – like the measuring 
in quantum mechanics – co-determines the 
answer. Vermersch points out that any de-
scription can
“ always be carried out from different perspec-
tives, there is never a single description, and this 
means that the same moment of lived experience 
can form the subject of a multiplicity of comple-
mentary and successive descriptions.” (Verm-
ersch 2009: 31)
The perspective adopted in the reflective in-
quiry will be determined by the horizon of 
reflection, which is formed by the subject’s 
implicit, to an extent culturally shaped (cf. 
Cohen, Hoshino‐Browne & Leung 2007) 
expectations about her own experiential life 
as well as her perception of the current so-
cial context and the ongoing development of 
the reflective act. We thus propose not only 
that the enacted belief about experience 
depends on the initial perspective, but that 
in the process of enaction, the perspective 
is constantly being chosen in the subject’s 
continuous punctuation of her experiential 
field. The term punctuation of experience 
is here used to designate the subject’s cur-
rent choice about which aspect of the field 
of experience should be focused on. As in 
quantum mechanics where measurement 
“selects” a given state of the particle (the 
result of the measurement), punctuation 
leads from a probability cloud to a single 
determined step in the formation of belief 
about experience. It is precisely this constant 
punctuation that forms the basis of the pro-
cedure of reflection: the continuous act of 
choosing the path, which is being laid down 
under the horizon of expectations.
« 25 » The probing, understood as ask-
ing about the “what was it like” of past ex-
perience, is intertwined with the attempts 
at answering the question by articulating 
certain experiential aspects.2 These two acts 
2 | Although the present article does not 
further explore the significance of verbalization, 
language is certainly one of the important factors 
that shape the horizon of reflection. The reflec-
tive process is clearly not always connected to or 
– which can amount to minimal experien-
tial moments and are not necessarily linked 
to linguistic concepts and expression – are 
connected through a relationship of mutual 
dependence: the enaction of belief about 
experience is an iterative process that con-
stantly interweaves punctuation and obser-
vation of experience on the one hand and 
its articulation on the other. Punctuation 
and articulation of experience are circu-
larly connected to anticipation, through 
which the articulation of the current aspect 
of experience (combined with other factors 
in the horizon of expectations) determines 
which aspect the subject will focus on in 
the next moment and articulate in the fol-
lowing step.
« 26 » The horizons of expectations 
that guide the gradual formation of belief 
about past experience through continu-
ous punctuation form “channels” in which 
each ongoing step in the act of answering 
significantly determines the next one. The 
idea of anticipation-canalized cognitive 
processing, which plays a crucial role in 
our understanding of the process of reflec-
tion, can be found in more general dis-
cussions about the role of anticipation in 
cognition (e.g., Riegler 2001b). The central 
importance of expectation and prediction 
is being increasingly recognized in cogni-
tive science, especially in the broad field of 
research of perception and consciousness 
encompassed under the title of predictive 
processing (e.g., Clark 2013; Friston 2010; 
Hohwy 2013).
followed by an act of overt verbal articulation. 
nonetheless, beliefs about past experience or 
the process of their enaction are often commu-
nicated. In such cases (e.g., in reporting on expe-
rience in a scientific setting), verbal articulation 
may play a substantial role in guiding the process 
of reflective probing and answering, potentially 
adding to, changing or losing several aspects 
of experience (cf. schooler 2002), or selectively 
choosing its more communicable features. More 
broadly, linguistic concepts might generally – 
even in the absence of expression – influence the 
reflective process by serving as cues for the con-
sidered aspects of experience.
Experiential moments of the 
enaction of belief: Intent, gist, 
and excavation
« 27 » We will now delineate some of 
the experiential modalities involved in the 
phenomenology of reflection with empha-
sis on those that are rarely mentioned or 
even entirely neglected. We describe three 
important experiential moments on the 
path towards the enaction of belief: (1) the 
intent to probe into the past experience, (2) 
the feeling of confidence of being able to ac-
cess the experience and answer “what it was 
like,” and (3) the articulation, or as we call 
it, excavation of the answer.
1 | Intent to probe: Asking the 
question “what was it like”
« 28 » By intent to probe we do not 
mean the circumstances or motives that 
lead to inner probing. These can vary to a 
great extent: from the phenomenological 
interview to self-exploration, from a simple 
association chain to serious, systematic re-
flection. If we are to investigate the process 
of the experience of reflection, we must first 
point out the introductory gesture – the 
emergence of intent to attend, i.e., a gesture 
experienced as the intent to “survey” a (se-
lected) part of experience (“I am interested 
in what this confusion was like,” 5/Box 1).
« 29 » In many aspects, the experience 
of intent manifests itself as essentially dif-
ferent from all other experiential modalities. 
The term “intent” is used here to distinguish 
this experience from a belief that something 
was decided, which we can – for the purpose 
of this article – call “intention.” The two are 
experientially considerably different – the 
first is a gesture (cf. depraz, Varela & Verm-
ersch 2003), a directedness towards an un-
dertaking, whilst the second is a mental con-
struct. For instance: if we rationally decide 
to move our finger (intention), this does not 
yet suffice to actually trigger the activity of 
moving the finger. But the feeling of intent 
cannot emerge alone – without the experi-
enced activity of moving the finger. The case 
of experiential acts is similar. It appears that 
the intent to probe is identical to probing it-
self – once the gesture of intent to “survey” 
a certain part of experience happens, reflec-
tion is already taking place (“This ‘mistake’ 
somehow attracts me – I look at this part 
of the memory more in detail,” 9/Box  1). 
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The conscious retrospection starts with an 
act or rather a gesture that is not rational 
and the essence of which is similar to that 
of any other intent. The gesture in question 
appears not to be directly accessible; never-
theless, there is a distinct feeling that such a 
gesture is a (very special) kind of experience. 
It also seems that this almost infinitesimal 
phenomenon somehow contains condensed 
information about the above-mentioned 
complex plethora of factors, constituting the 
horizon of the probe.
« 30 » The pre-reflective nature of the 
gesture of intent is equally veiled in all cases: 
the intent to carry out a physical activity no 
less than the intent to probe what is where 
in our visual field or – as in our case – to 
explore what it was like to experience at a 
selected moment in the past. It seems typical 
of the gesture of intent that it exists at the 
fringe of reflected experience, as if it could 
only reside right there, far from the focus 
of attention and consequently far from any 
clear description.
2 | Confidence that I can answer the 
question “what was it like”
« 31 » As already mentioned, this model 
focuses only on cases in which probing actu-
ally leads to positive results. Experientially, 
reports on this point can be summarized as 
“the feeling of confidence that I can answer” 
the question of what the selected experience 
was like. It feels like the “gist” of the answer 
has been located and its essence felt, even 
though it has not yet been precisely formu-
lated. It is like finding the right book at the 
library – once located, it endows us with 
confidence that we can answer the ques-
tion even though a concrete answer has not 
yet been formed. (“It feels like going into a 
space, slightly blurred and delimited from 
another space – like an enclosed mist – this 
is the memory. I have found it. In fact, it all 
comes to me very quickly, I don’t really need 
to search,” 2/Box 1.)
« 32 » The experience of gist might 
be compared to the descriptions of Ed-
ward titchener’s analyses connected to his 
research into the existence of imageless 
thoughts: “Vague and elusive processes, 
which carry as if in a nutshell the entire 
meaning of a situation” (in Bitbol & Petit-
mengin 2013b: 188). In our research, the 
participants often compared the experience 
of the feeling of knowing the gist of the an-
swer to a cloud or a foggy area hiding the 
answer (“I look at this part of the memory 
more in detail, I somehow sharpen the ap-
propriate part, which was before hidden in 
the mist,” 9/Box 1; see also 3 and 7/Box 1 for 
a representative description).
« 33 » such knowledge is not yet re-
vealed. The subject, however, experiences 
the reference of the process of enaction to 
the original past experience, which is felt to 
correspond to what is being enacted. This 
kind of experience, which we call the feeling 
of veracity, seems to coincide with the feel-
ing that Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmen-
gin (2013a), in their work on performative 
evaluative criteria of first-person inquiry 
and reports, designate as “recognition,” but 
also – very appropriately – the “feeling of 
obviousness.” (“I now see that my sense of 
the time was not accurate,” 10/Box  1; the 
feeling of veracity can also take the form of 
the lack of sensed correspondence: “[A]t the 
same time I immediately feel that this is not 
the only aspect to it,” 5/Box 1.) The feeling 
of veracity of what is being enacted is the 
most significant guide through the reflec-
tive act and, as we will discuss below, plays 
an important role in ensuring the coherence 
and viability of the process of the enaction 
of belief. In its limitation to the experiential 
sphere of the reflecting subject, however, the 
feeling of veracity by no means bears on the 
ontological value of past experience exam-
ined in reflection or implies anything about 
its correspondence with the enacted belief 
about it beyond the first-person domain.
« 34 » The experience of confidence that 
one can answer “what it was like” and the 
beginning of proper enaction of belief might 
be separated by an infinitesimally small step, 
sometimes so fleeting it goes by unnoticed. 
However, the clarification of the fog and the 
outlining of the answer may not occur at all 
and we settle for the experience of the gist of 
having access to the answer.
3 | Answering: The excavation of the 
belief about past experience
« 35 » delineating the structure of past 
experience out of the unarticulated gist is 
similar to excavating an archeological site 
– each further step additionally clarifies the 
picture and at the same time defines (nar-
rows down) the array of possibilities of the 
final image. Is this excavation mere passive 
observation or an active process of con-
struction? some of the reports (e.g., depraz, 
Varela & Vermersch 2003) mention the ef-
fort exerted in the process of enaction of 
belief about past experience, the effort con-
nected to browsing through one’s memory. 
This would suggest the active (and there-
fore constructive) nature of the process of 
excavation. on the other hand, Bitbol and 
Petitmengin assure us that – provided the 
preparations for retrospection have been 
carried out properly – enaction happens 
involuntarily, describing the “spontaneity 
of the emergence of elements of the evoked 
experience” (Bitbol & Petitmengin 2013a: 
275). Vermersch seems to corroborate this 
“passive” perspective, claiming that “[s]
econdary remembrance does not consist in 
an effort of memory, but in letting some-
thing emerge during the evocation of a 
singular past lived experience” (Vermersch 
2009: 19f).
« 36 » It appears that such excavation 
may include different experiential mo-
dalities. The attitude towards experience as 
adopted by the subject probably plays an 
important role in this. The adoption of the 
position of phenomenological reduction 
would probably be related to the feeling of 
acceptance of the emerging experience such 
as it is, i.e., the absence of inner endeavor-
ing. This is confirmed by the above-men-
tioned research by Bitbol and Petitmengin 
(2013a: 275), where spontaneous emergence 
is associated with “adopting a specific atten-
tional disposition.” When depraz, Varela & 
Vermersch (2003) write that the gesture of 
becoming aware is “not a construction,” this 
seems to be exactly what they mean – that it 
is an attempt at bracketing active interpreta-
tion. However, it is important to emphasize 
that the absence of the sense of construction 
does not determine the epistemological sta-
tus of the constructed belief. Furthermore, 
the adoption of the specific (non-construct-
ing) attentional disposition does not imply 
the absence of a horizon. understanding 
reflection as a type of continuous punctua-
tion of the experiential field that involves a 
repeated adoption of a certain perspective, 
it would probably not be wrong to charac-
terize the process of enaction of belief about 
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twenty (or more) questions
« 37 » using the terminology presented 
in the above model, the iterative and self-
referential dynamics of the reflective pro-
cess can be described as a dialectic of prob-
ing (asking) and answering. determined by 
a horizon of expectations, the act of probing 
will direct the reflecting subject’s attention 
towards a particular area of the not-yet-
articulated “gist cloud.” once she attempts 
to articulate her experience, the process of 
articulation will play a further critical role 
in the narrowing down and orienting of the 
field of punctuation. Throughout the differ-
ent steps of the reflective process, answering 
the question “what was it like” will thus af-
fect the following step of the probing, with 
that which has been excavated determin-
ing the spectrum of possibilities for further 
questioning.
« 38 » The well-known physicist John 
Archibald Wheeler once attempted to de-
scribe the quantum process of the wave func-
tion collapse by using the game of twenty 
questions as a metaphor (in davies & Brown 
1986). We suggest that this metaphor is also 
most appropriate for describing the itera-
tive, self-referential process of creating belief 
about (past) experience. The game of twenty 
questions begins when one of the players (let 
us call her the inquirer) leaves the room. The 
others then select an object, a person, an ani-
mal, etc. The aim of the inquirer is to discover 
what it is that the other players have selected. 
she, in the course of twenty questions, tries 
to pinpoint the object in question. Wheeler 
thought that this might be a good description 
of the collapse of the wave function – pro-
vided a little twist be added to the game: in 
Wheeler’s version, when the inquirer leaves 
the room, the other players do not select an 
object. All other rules apply. The inquirer, be-
lieving that somewhere in the minds of the 
other players there exists the selected object, 
starts asking questions and thus narrows 
down the space for the potential conclusions 
of the game. The participants are bound to 
take account of all previous answers – every 
new answer has to be consistent with all the 
previous ones. The final answer is thus en-
acted through an interchange of questions 
and answers. Every question co-determines 
the answer, every answer narrows down the 
set of possible questions. This process might 
in the end bring us to a point in which only 
one entity appears possible – or in which the 
answer seems to be convincing or exhaustive 
enough for the players to decide to end the 
game. But it just as well might not, in which 
case the answer is left hanging.
« 39 » It would appear that the ques-
tion-answer feedback loop involved in our 
characterization of reflection might be frac-
tally experienced at several levels and traced 
back to infinitesimal experiential moments 
in which both opposites merge. Vermersch 
(2009: 32) describes such potentially infinite 
iteration as “granularity of the description 
and fragmentation/expansion.” Here, the 
question emerges whether it is still phenom-
enologically viable to distinguish between 
them. Perhaps the perception of oscillation 
between the position of observer of one’s 
own experience and the position of be-
ing thrown into experience such as it is is 
merely a consequence of what Husserl calls 
the natural attitude. A persistent training in 
phenomenological reduction might eventu-
ally lead to a bracketing of such perspec-
tives. Just like physicists were forced to coin 
the new entity of wave-particle, phenom-
enological praxis may need to start seeing 
its “building parts” as (something along the 
lines of) probing-observing.
towards constructivist 
epistemology for the study 
of experience
« 40 » We have described reflection as 
a constructive process that co-determines 
the resulting belief. This co-determination 
makes it inappropriate to evaluate the re-
sults of reflection against standard objectiv-
ist frameworks of cognitive science, which 
are at their core marked by the demand 
for separation between the observer and 
the observed. Instead, we suggest that re-
flection and reflectively gained knowledge 
can be better understood through the lens 
of (radical) constructivism. Constructivist 
epistemology argues that knowledge, rather 
than being passively acquired, is actively 
constructed by the cognizing subject, and 
that the function of cognition, rather than 
to discover an objective ontological reality, 
is to organize the cognizing subject’s experi-
ential world (Glasersfeld 1988).
« 41 » Recognizing that knowledge 
cannot transcend the domain of experience, 
radical constructivism refrains from mak-
ing any ontological claims about the struc-
ture and existence of a mind-independent 
reality (Riegler 2001a). We suggest adopt-
ing an equally agnostic stance towards the 
ontological status of the supposedly pre-
existing original experience examined in 
reflection and its correspondence with the 
enacted belief about it. We see little sense 
in evaluating reflection in terms of its ca-
pacity to represent the “pure,” “unspoiled,” 
or “pristine” original experience. since it is 
impossible to reach a past experience in any 
other way than by means of reflection, there 
exists no external, third-person reference 
point against which such objective assess-
ment could even in principle be made. We 
therefore conclude that in studying experi-
ence, constructivist epistemology presents a 
more suitable and much needed alternative 
to the epistemological objectivism of scien-
tific realist cognitive science.
« 42 » our position seems vulnerable 
to an intuitive objection: if our beliefs about 
past experience are the results of construc-
tion, how come we can nevertheless so often 
rely on what is gained in reflection? After 
all, the “factual” contents of our past experi-
ence brought forward in reflection (e.g., the 
external circumstances in which the past 
experience took place) seem, for the most 
part, to ensure viability in correspondence 
with other sources of knowledge.
« 43 » This objection, here aimed at 
reflection in particular, can be considered 
an instance of a more general objection to 
the constructivist view of knowledge: if the 
world is constructed, how come we can nev-
ertheless successfully navigate through it – 
without, for instance, bumping into closed 
doors (Riegler 2001a)?
« 44 » However intuitively plausible, this 
criticism is based on a misunderstanding of 
the construction as arbitrary construction. 
As Alexander Riegler (2001a: 7) points out in 
what he calls the “Limitations of Construc-
tion Postulate,” experiences are, even in the 
obvious absence of a subject-independent 
external reference point, not constructed in-
dependently of one another. Rather, they are 
made subsequently and thus related to one 
another in a non-arbitrary construction net-
work of historical interdependencies. Recog-
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nizing the mutual constraints and the inter-
dependency among experiences, one should 
understand construction not as a matter of 
free arbitrariness, but instead as a historically 
constrained and thoroughly non-arbitrary 
activity of the mind.
« 45 » In the particular case of reflec-
tion, the constructivist perspective makes it 
clear that giving up the idea of an external 
reference point does not lead to an “any-
thing goes” understanding of reflectively 
acquired beliefs, just as giving up the refer-
ence to a mind-independent reality does not 
lead to an arbitrary experienced world in 
which one could walk through closed doors. 
Quite on the contrary: as described in our 
model, enaction is an iterative process in 
which each step narrows down the field of 
possible next steps – while being at the same 
time itself shaped by the reflecting subject’s 
implicit understanding of her experiential 
life and the social context of the reflective 
process as well as the previous steps of the 
reflective process.
« 46 » The non-arbitrary character of 
enaction, we suggest, can be linked to cer-
tain experiential aspects of the act of reflec-
tion, which makes possible a turn from the 
unattainable third-person correspondence 
criteria for the validity of reflection and its 
results towards a more appropriate first-per-
son evaluative basis. As suggested by Bitbol 
and Petitmengin (2013a), the evaluation of 
reflection and first-person reports can be 
grounded in the experienced and self-as-
sessed performative coherence of the process 
of reflection. on the basis of a preliminary 
empirical study of first-person reports, they 
point to various experiential criteria for self-
assessed reliability and validity of the act 
and results of reflection, e.g., the “spontane-
ity of the emergence of constitutive elements 
of the re-enacted experience,” the “incre-
mental nature of the fulfillment of evoca-
tion of experience,” the “‘recognition’ of the 
elements brought out by the re-enactment,” 
and the “feeling of obviousness” (ibid: 275f). 
Crucially, the idea of evaluation (as well as 
Bitbol and Petitmengin’s notions of “reli-
ability” and “validity”) is here not construed 
on an objectivist premise. When situated 
in a constructivist framework, experiential 
criteria need not be concerned with the cor-
respondence of the results of reflection with 
the supposed (and ultimately unattainable) 
“original experience,” but with ensuring that 
the reflective process is viably constructed 
within the historically interdependent net-
work of experiences.
« 47 » The shift to the first-person eval-
uative criteria draws attention to the often-
forgotten consideration that the mere capac-
ity to reflect does not automatically ensure 
the viability of the reflective process (Varela 
1996; depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003; 
Vermersch 2009). As any kind of “measure-
ment,” reflection can be performed in a bet-
ter or worse way, depending on the subject’s 
capacity to follow the experiential guidelines 
on the path towards the enaction of belief. 
In the model put forward in this article, the 
most prominent experiential guide tending 
to the non-arbitrariness of reflection has 
been described as the feeling of veracity, 
i.e., the experience of correspondence of the 
process of enaction of belief to the original 
past experience. This feeling, which could 
serve as an experiential criterion of the via-
bility of the reflective process and its results, 
steers – when present – the subject through 
the reflective act towards the resulting be-
lief about past experience. The experiential 
criteria are thus not important only for the 
a posteriori assessment of phenomenologi-
cal data, but are also incessantly operant in 
guiding each act of reflection.
second-person 
methods in the science 
of consciousness
« 48 » despite their limitation to the 
experiential sphere of the reflecting subject, 
first-person guides and evaluative criteria of 
the reflective process can nevertheless be in-
tersubjectively shared. one of the purposes 
of the proposed model is to facilitate such 
sharing by providing potential conceptual 
anchors for the establishment of “descrip-
tive categories” of lived experience (see 
Vermersch 2009). According to Vermersch, 
such anchors are needed for the possibility 
of intersubjective guidance of the process 
of reflection that lies at the heart of second-
person methods for the study of experi-
ence. two such most widely established and 
used methods are the elicitation interview 
technique originally developed by Vermer-
sch (2009) and elaborated and extensively 
characterized by Petitmengin (2006), and 
the descriptive experience sampling method 
developed by Russell Hurlburt (2009). Both 
approaches, while they involve distinct epis-
temological and methodological views and 
commitments, rely on the interactive acqui-
sition of first-person data in which the col-
laborating “subject” and “interviewer” are 
perhaps better described as “co-researchers” 
of the past experience.
« 49 » Far more than being a mere 
passive listener to the subject’s verbal de-
scriptions of experience, the interviewer in 
second-person methods actively helps the 
subject examine a concrete past experience 
as it was primarily given, for instance, by 
leading the subject away from interpreting, 
explaining and justifying; providing guid-
ance in the articulation of the fuzzy, perhaps 
only bodily felt aspects of the recalled expe-
rience; assessing the viability of the ongoing 
reflective process and steering it in an opti-
mal direction; etc. Whereas the past experi-
ence might be given in the first person only 
to the subject, the enaction of belief about it 
via second-person methods is therefore es-
sentially interactive and social.3 The patterns 
of interaction involved in the second-person 
methods constitute significant factors of the 
subject’s horizon of expectations and im-
portantly co-determine the structure of the 
reflective process. The iterative punctuation 
3 | More generally, a similar social dimen-
sion – while perhaps less apparent – might be 
identified in any scientific acquisition of experien-
tial data. As pointed out by Martin orne (1962), 
any psychological experiment involves a set of 
so-called demand characteristics – explicit or im-
plicit cues that co-form a subject’s performance in 
the experiment in addition to measured variables 
and selected conditions. Individually formed ex-
pectations inevitably lead participants to ascribe 
meaning and intention to the experimental situ-
ation and perform accordingly (attempting, for 
instance, to please or contradict the experimenter, 
or to go along with or against what they believe to 
be the hypothesis of the experiment). Recogniz-
ing that demand characteristics form an unavoid-
able part of all (not only explicitly interactive) 
experimental settings, it has been suggested that 
psychological experiments should be understood 
as a particular type of social interaction (orne 
1962), and reports on experience as products of 
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of the subject’s past experience is performed 
in an overt cooperation of the two co-re-
searchers, who – depending on the previous 
steps of the reflective act and the horizon of 
expectations – jointly lay down the path to-
wards the enaction of belief.
« 50 » We suggest that the acquisition of 
phenomenological data with second-person 
techniques can be understood as a typi-
cal instance of participatory sense-making. 
As its proponents Hanne de Jaegher and 
Ezequiel di Paolo (2007) explain, the notion 
of participatory sense-making refers to the 
frequent phenomenon in which the process 
of social interaction takes on a form of au-
tonomy that reaches beyond the individual 
autonomy of involved participants. In such 
instances, the patterns of coordinated be-
havior and meaning emerge as an entity with 
its own guiding force over the ongoing in-
teraction. The meaning jointly generated in 
such interaction is irreducible to individual 
acts of any one of the involved participants, 
but is instead shared through and through. 
describing the reflective act carried out by 
means of second-person methods as an ex-
ample of participatory sense-making, the 
enacted belief about past experience can be 
considered a joint product of the two inter-
acting co-researchers.
« 51 » In our first-person research prax-
is, we have observed substantial interper-
sonal differences in the implicit perception 
of the social situation in which the enaction 
takes place. In the participatory setting, a 
communicational situation that appears 
the same on the outside can be perceived as 
distinct by two different participants, who 
might focus on entirely different aspects 
of their experience and ascribe different 
meanings to the act of reporting despite 
the identical patterns of interaction with 
their co-researcher. For instance, while one 
might be completely content-oriented and 
explore her experience with less regard for 
the presupposed intent of the person lead-
ing the interview, the other might implicitly 
perceive reporting to be mainly a way of 
establishing social relations with the co-re-
searcher. We have empirically demonstrat-
ed that this “feeling of relationship” (Kordeš 
& Klauser 2016: 375) importantly contrib-
utes to the performance of the reflective act 
in second-person settings.
« 52 » Given the unavoidable influence 
of the researchers of experience on the re-
sults of reflection, it is all the more impor-
tant that researchers themselves have a deep 
understanding of the experiential dynamics 
of the reflective process. We hope that the 
present investigation, together with future 
empirical testing of our model, can serve as 
a step on the path towards this understand-
ing.
Conclusion
« 53 » In philosophy, the phenomeno-
logical tradition has developed theoretical 
models of consciousness by describing fun-
damental structures of experience. These 
models, however, lack an empirical context. 
In the last few decades, this gap has been 
increasingly filled in by the field of first-
person research, developing more and more 
thought-out methods for accessing phe-
nomenological data. The problem with both 
fields, phenomenology and first-person re-
search, is that they mostly still linger within 
the constraints of standard epistemologi-
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cal frameworks, viewing self-referentiality 
and circular causality – two fundamental 
companions of experience research – as 
problematic. Based on its ability to reframe 
the vicious cycle of self-referentiality into 
a constructive loop, constructivism could 
provide useful epistemological solutions. 
The unavoidable effect of observation on the 
examined experience, which depraz, Varela 
& Vermersch (2003) have labeled the exca-
vation fallacy, is incorporated into the very 
essence of the constructivist framework. By 
adopting such a framework, the fallacy be-
comes an excavation characteristic.
« 54 » not unlike in the epistemology 
of quantum mechanics, the endorsement of 
the constructivist perspective on the inevi-
table interdependence between observing 
and the observed brings us to the imperative 
of knowing the characteristics of “measure-
ment” in order to understand the results. 
If we are to understand reflectively formed 
beliefs about experience, we must know the 
characteristics of their formation. This ar-
ticle has offered a model of experiential dy-
namics of the enaction of belief about past 
experience. We have deliberately spoken of 
the “excavation of experience” in order to 
stress self-referentiality as a necessary part 
of a constructive (as opposed to a vicious) 
cycle. As pointed out in Kordeš (2016), the 
constructivist framework can cope with the 
self-referential characteristics present in in-
vestigating experience and withstand the sit-
uation in which the same phenomenon – in 
our case, first-person aspects of the enaction 
of belief – presents at the same time a field of 
research as well as conditions for research. 
We see the proposed model of enaction as a 
starting point, an approximation that in the 
future needs to be enriched with philosophi-
cally critical phenomenological analysis on 
one side, and with first-person empirical 
research (based on reflection) on the other.
« 55 » Whereas the purpose of the pres-
ent article has been to examine the experien-
tial structure of the reflective act and relate 
the findings to certain ideas from construc-
tivist epistemology, our study of reflection 
is motivated by a more wide-ranging aim 
to contribute to the ongoing debate on epis-
temological and methodological issues in 
first-person research. In particular, we wish 
to support the research program of empirical 
phenomenology (Kordeš 2016), a developing 
transdisciplinary line of research that con-
nects the fields of constructivism, phenom-
enology, and first-person inquiry. Empirical 
phenomenology suggests that collaboration 
between constructivism and phenomenol-
ogy could result in the establishment of an 
improved framework for the empirical study 
of experience.
« 56 » The findings put forward in this 
article call for a firmer theoretical grounding 
of the experiential structure of the enaction 
of belief. In our future work, we would like 
to relate the presented understanding of the 
reflective act to the rich field of theoretical 
work on reflection in philosophical phe-
nomenology, and demonstrate the potential 
for mutual enrichment between the phe-
nomenological and constructivist take on 
the practice and epistemology of reflection.
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